CHARLES W. MEAD vs. E. C. McCULLOUGH, ET AL., and THE PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
CHARLES
W. MEAD vs. E. C. McCULLOUGH, ET AL., and THE PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING AND
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
G.R.
No. 6217 December 26, 1911
Facts:
1.
On
March 15, 1902, the plaintiff and the defendant organized the "Philippine
Engineering and Construction Company," the incorporators being the only
stockholders and also the directors of said company, with general ordinary
powers.
2.
After
the plaintiff left the Philippine Islands for China, the other directors, the
defendants in this case, held a meeting on December 24, 1903, for the purpose
of discussing the condition of the company at that time anddetermining what
course to pursue.
3.
They
did on that date enter into wrecking contract with the naval authorities with
the defendant McCullough.
4.
When
the sale or transfer took place, there were present four directors, all of whom
gave their consent to that sale or transfer. The plaintiff was then about and
his express consent to make this transfer or sale was not obtained. He was,
before leaving, one of the directors in this corporation, and although he had
resigned as manager, he had not resigned as a director.
Issue:
Did a majority
of the stockholders, who were at the same time a majority of the directors of
this corporation, have the power under the law and its articles of agreement,
to sell or transfer to one of its members the assets of said corporation?
Ruling:
He accepted the
position of engineer of the Canton and Shanghai Railway Company, knowing that
his duties as such engineer would require his whole time and attention and
prevent his returning to the Philippine Islands for at least a year or more.
The new position which he accepted in China was incompatible with his position
as director in the Philippine Engineering and Construction Company, a
corporation whose sphere of operations was limited to the Philippine Islands.
These facts are sufficient to constitute an abandoning or vacating of his
position as director in said corporation.
Consequently,
the transfer orsale of the corporation's assets to one of its members was made
by the unanimous consent of all the directors in the corporation at that time.
There were only
five stockholders in this corporation at any time, four of whom were the
directors who made thesale, and the other the plaintiff, who was absent in
China when the said sale took place. The sale was, therefore, made by the
unanimous consent of four-fifths of all the stockholders. Under the articles of
incorporation, the stockholders and directors had general ordinary powers.
There is nothing in said articles which expressly prohibitsthe sale or transfer
of the corporate property to one of the stockholders of said corporation.
Articles 1700 to
1708 of the Civil Code deal with the manner of dissolving a corporation. There
is nothing in thesearticles which expressly or impliedly prohibits the sale of
corporate property to one of its members, nor a dissolutionof a corporation in
this manner. Neither is there anything in articles 151 to 174 of the Code of
Commerce which prohibits the dissolution of a corporation by such sale or
transfer.
Article XIII of
the corporation's statutes expressly provides that "in all the meetings of
the stockholders, a majorityvote of the stockholders present shall be necessary
to determine any question discussed."
The sale or
transfer to one of its members was a matter which a majority of the stockholders
could very properlyconsider. But it i said that if the acts and resolutions of
a majority of the stockholders in a corporation are binding in every case upon
the minority, the minority would be completely wiped out and their rights would
be wholly at the mercy of the abuses of the majority.
Generally
speaking, the voice of a majority of the stockholders is the law of the
corporation, but there are exceptionsto this rule. There must necessarily be a
limit upon the power of the majority. Without such a limit the will of the majority
would be absolute and irresistible and might easily degenerate into an arbitrary
tyranny. The reason for these limitations is that in every contract of
partnership and a corporation can be something fundamental and unalterable
which is beyond the power of the majority of the stockholders, and which constitutes
the rule controlling their actions. This rule which must be observed is to be
found in the essential compacts of such partnership, which gave served as a
basis upon which the members have united, and without which it is not probable
that they would have entered the corporation. Notwithstanding these limitations
upon the power of the majority of the stockholders, their (the majority's)
resolutions, when passed in good faith and for a just cause, deserve careful consideration
and are generally binding upon the minority.
Itis well
settled, first, that a private corporation, which owes no special duty tothe
public and which has not been given the right of eminent domain, has the absolute
right and power as against the whole world except the state, to sell and
dispose of all of its property; second, that the board of directors, has the power,
without reference to the assent or authority of the stockholders, when the
corporation is in failing circumstances or insolvent or when it can no longer
continue the business with profit, and when it is regarded as an imperative
necessity; third, that a majority of the stockholders or directors, even against
the protest of the minority, have this power where, from any cause, the
business is a failure and the best interest of the corporation and all the stockholders
require it
We therefore
conclude that the sale or transfer made by the quorum of the board of directors
— a majority of the stockholders — is valid and binding upon the majority-the
plaintiff. This conclusion is not in violation of the articles of incorporation
of the Philippine Engineering and Construction Company.
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